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A Bradford Book, 8/20/Date: 2004. New. A Bradford Book, 8/20/2004 New All orders ship SAME or NEXT business day Expedited shipments will be received in 5-12 business days within the United States 100% Satisfaction Guaranteed! 2004. A Bradford Book ISBN 0262633086 9780262633086 [VN]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: MIT Press] Softcover Thomas Metzinger is Professor of Philosophy and Fellow at the Gutenberg Research College at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, and an Adjunct Fellow at the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Study in Frankfurt am Main. He is the editor of Neur. [Greven, Germany] [Publication Year: 2004]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: MIT Press] Softcover New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. [Fairford, GLOS, United Kingdom] [Publication Year: 2004]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: Bradford Books] Softcover Book is in NEW condition. Satisfaction Guaranteed! Fast Customer Service!! [Suffolk, United Kingdom] [Publication Year: 2004]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: MIT Press] Softcover Thomas Metzinger is Professor of Philosophy and Fellow at the Gutenberg Research College at the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, and an Adjunct Fellow at the Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Study in Frankfurt am Main. He is the editor of Neur. [Greven, Germany] [Publication Year: 2004]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: Bradford Books] Softcover New. US edition. Expediting shipping for all USA and Europe orders excluding PO Box. Excellent Customer Service. [Irving, TX, U.S.A.] [Publication Year: 2004]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: MIT Press Ltd] Softcover 2004. New Ed. Paperback. A representationalist, empirically based philosophical exploration of consciousness, the subjective experience of selfhood, and the first-person perspective. Num Pages: 714 pages, 14 illus. BIC Classification: HPM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 227 x 180 x 34. Weight in Grams: 1030. . . . . . [Galway, GY, Ireland] [Publication Year: 2004]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: MIT Press Ltd] Softcover New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days. A representationalist, empirically based philosophical exploration of consciousness, the subjective experience of selfhood, and the first-person perspective. [Southport, United Kingdom] [Publication Year: 2004]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: MIT Press] Softcover New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000. [Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.] [Publication Year: 2004]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: The MIT Press Aug 2004] Softcover Neuware - According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a 'transparent self-model.' In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper repre ...
MIT Press 9/7/2004 12: 00: 00 AM Softcover New Book. Shipped from UK in 4 to 14 days. Established seller since 2000. Please note we cannot offer an expedited shipping service from the UK.
MIT Press 9/7/2004 12: 00: 00 AM Softcover PLEASE NOTE, WE DO NOT SHIP TO DENMARK. New Book. Shipped from UK in 4 to 14 days. Established seller since 2000. Please note we cannot offer an expedited shipping service from the UK.
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: Bradford Books] Softcover Book is in Used-Good condition. Pages and cover are clean and intact. Used items may not include supplementary materials such as CDs or access codes. May show signs of minor shelf wear and contain limited notes and highlighting. [Hawthorne, CA, U.S.A.] [Publication Year: 2004]
Metzinger Thomas Professor of Philosophy Johannes Gutenberg Universitat Mainz
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Paperback / softback. New. New Book; Fast Shipping from UK; Not signed; Not First Edition; According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but a ISBN 0262633086 9780262633086 [GB]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: Bradford Books] Softcover Book is in NEW condition. [Hawthorne, CA, U.S.A.] [Publication Year: 2004]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: MIT Press Ltd, Massachusetts] Softcover Paperback. According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world- nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is- How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deep ...
MIT Press 9/7/2004 12: 00: 00 AM Softcover PLEASE NOTE, WE DO NOT SHIP TO DENMARK. New Book. Shipped from UK in 4 to 14 days. Established seller since 2000. Please note we cannot offer an expedited shipping service from the UK.
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: The MIT Press Aug 2004] Softcover Neuware - According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a 'transparent self-model.' In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper repre ...
MIT Press (MA) 2004 Trade paperback New 2004. New Ed. Paperback. A representationalist, empirically based philosophical exploration of consciousness, the subjective experience of selfhood, and the first-person perspective. Num Pages: 714 pages, 14 illus. BIC Classification: HPM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 227 x 180 x 34. Weight in Grams: 1030......We ship daily from our Bookshop.
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: MIT Press Ltd] Softcover 2004. New Ed. Paperback. A representationalist, empirically based philosophical exploration of consciousness, the subjective experience of selfhood, and the first-person perspective. Num Pages: 714 pages, 14 illus. BIC Classification: HPM. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 227 x 180 x 34. Weight in Grams: 1030. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. [Olney, MD, U.S.A.] [Publication Year: 2004]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: MIT Press Ltd, Massachusetts] Softcover Paperback. According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world- nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is- How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deep ...
A Bradford Book, Date: 2004-08-20. Paperback. New. New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title! 2004. A Bradford Book ISBN 0262633086 9780262633086 [US]
ISBN10: 0262633086, ISBN13: 9780262633086, [publisher: A Bradford Book] Softcover 0262633086 [DH, SE, Spain] [Publication Year: 2004]
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When you click on links to various merchants on this site and make a purchase, this can result in this site earning a commission at no extra cost to you. Affiliate programs and affiliations include, but are not limited to, the eBay Partner Network, Amazon and Alibris.
