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ISBN10: 0313295700, ISBN13: 9780313295706, [publisher: Praeger Publishers] Hardcover Bumped edges. Bumped spine Sun Damage to edge of pages. Appears unread, may have minor damage from transit/storage. Next day dispatch from the UK (Mon-Fri). Please contact us with any queries. [Hereford, United Kingdom] [Publication Year: 1995]
Praeger Publishers 1995 hardcover Very good Bumped edges. Bumped spine Sun Damage to edge of pages. Appears unread, may have minor damage from transit/storage. Next working day dispatch from the UK (Mon-Fri). Please contact us with any queries.
Hard Cover. New. New Book; Fast Shipping from UK; Not signed; Not First Edition; The Between Ideology and Realpolitik: Woodrow Wilson and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1921. ISBN 0313295700 9780313295706 [GB]
ABC-CLIO 1/27/1995 12: 06: 00 AM Hardcover PLEASE NOTE, WE DO NOT SHIP TO DENMARK. New Book. Shipped from UK in 4 to 14 days. Established seller since 2000. Please note we cannot offer an expedited shipping service from the UK.
ISBN10: 0313295700, ISBN13: 9780313295706, [publisher: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, Westport] Hardcover Hardcover. In this concise interpretation of Wilson's Russian policy, Schild challenges the belief that Wilson's response to the 1917 October Revolution was exclusively ideological. Contrary to the belief that when Wilson sent American troops to intervene in 1918, his goal was to establish a democratic order in Russia, this book shows that his actions were more pragmatic. Wilson's belief in the superiority of liberalism over totalitarianism was so strong that he expected democratic forces in Russia to take power without outside aid. At the Paris Peace Conference, he rejected suggestions for an anti-Soviet crusade. His July 1918 decision to intervene was not a part of Wilson's ideology. It was based on an effort to maintain unity with Britain and France during the final phase of World War I.Wilson did, indeed, have a liberal anti-Bolshevik agenda. However, his belief in the superiority of liberalism over totalitarianism was so strong that he expected democratic forces in Russia to take power without any outside aid. At the Paris Peace Conference, he rejected all suggestions for a Western anti-Soviet crusade or for a division of Russia. His 1918 decision to intervene was not part of Wilson's ideological confrontation with the Bolsheviks. It was based on an effort to maintain unity with the British and French governments during the final phase of ...
ISBN10: 0313295700, ISBN13: 9780313295706, [publisher: Bloomsbury 3PL] Hardcover nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - In this concise interpretation of Wilson's Russian policy, Schild challenges the belief that Wilson's response to the 1917 October Revolution was exclusively ideological. Contrary to the belief that when Wilson sent American troops to intervene in 1918, his goal was to establish a democratic order in Russia, this book shows that his actions were more pragmatic. Wilson's belief in the superiority of liberalism over totalitarianism was so strong that he expected democratic forces in Russia to take power without outside aid. At the Paris Peace Conference, he rejected suggestions for an anti-Soviet crusade. His July 1918 decision to intervene was not a part of Wilson's ideology. It was based on an effort to maintain unity with Britain and France during the final phase of World War I.Wilson did, indeed, have a liberal anti-Bolshevik agenda. However, his belief in the superiority of liberalism over totalitarianism was so strong that he expected democratic forces in Russia to take power without any outside aid. At the Paris Peace Conference, he rejected all suggestions for a Western anti-Soviet crusade or for a division of Russia. His 1918 decision to intervene was not part of Wilson's ideological confrontation with the Bolsheviks. It was based on an effort to maintain unity with the British and French gover ...
Westport, CT.: Greenwood Press, Date: 1995. Comprehensive scholarly text presents a detailed interpretation of Wilson's Russian policy in which Schild challenges the belief that Wilson's reaction to the 1917 October Revolution was exclusively ideological. In contrast to the belief that when Wilson sent American troops to intervene in July 1918, his goal was to aid liberal groups in Russia and thus to establish a democratic order, this book shows that his actions were more pragmatic. Wilson did, indeed, have a liberal anti-Bolshevik agenda. However, his belief in the superiority of liberalism over totalitarianism was so strong that he expected democratic forces in Russia to take power without any outside aid. At the Paris Peace Conference, he rejected all suggestions for a Western anti-Soviet crusade or for a division of Russia. His 1918 decision to intervene was not part of Wilson's ideological confrontation with the Bolsheviks. It was based on an effort to maintain unity with the British and French governments during the final phase of World War I. Wilson's Russian policy, the author concludes, was determined both by his ideological anti-Bolshevism and pragmatic demands for alliance cohesion. 173 pgs. Gilt spine and front cover.. First Edition. Hard Cover. As New. 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾" tall. 1995. Greenwood Press ISBN 0313295700 9780313295706 [US]
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