New York: Columbia University Press, Date: 2007. Hardcover. pp. 215. 8vo. Blue binding with gilt lettering to spine. Light shelfwear, dustjacket protected with plastic brodart sleeve; very good+ in very good+ dustjacket. 2007. Columbia University Press ISBN 0231140444 9780231140447 [CA]

Columbia University Press, Date: 2007-05-01. Hardcover. Used: Good. 2007. Columbia University Press ISBN 0231140444 9780231140447 [US]

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ISBN10: 0231140444, ISBN13: 9780231140447, [publisher: Columbia University Press] Hardcover New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.
[Wood Dale, IL, U.S.A.] [Publication Year: 2007]

Columbia University Press 4/20/2007 12: 00: 00 AM Hardcover PLEASE NOTE, WE DO NOT SHIP TO DENMARK. New Book. Shipped from UK in 4 to 14 days. Established seller since 2000. Please note we cannot offer an expedited shipping service from the UK.

Columbia University Press 4/20/2007 12: 00: 00 AM Hardcover PLEASE NOTE, WE DO NOT SHIP TO DENMARK. New Book. Shipped from UK in 4 to 14 days. Established seller since 2000. Please note we cannot offer an expedited shipping service from the UK.

ISBN10: 0231140444, ISBN13: 9780231140447, [publisher: Columbia University Press] Hardcover New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days. Presents fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature. This book discusses the clash of philosophers and neuroscientists over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. It is useful for those interested in the relation of mind to brain.
[Southport, United Kingdom] [Publication Year: 2007]

ISBN10: 0231140444, ISBN13: 9780231140447, [publisher: Columbia University Press, New York] Hardcover First Edition Hardcover. In Neuroscience and Philosophy three prominent philosophers and a leading neuroscientist clash over the conceptual presuppositions of cognitive neuroscience. The book begins with an excerpt from Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker's Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, 2003), which questions the conceptual commitments of cognitive neuroscientists. Their position is then criticized by Daniel Dennett and John Searle, two philosophers who have written extensively on the subject, and Bennett and Hacker in turn respond.Their impassioned debate encompasses a wide range of central themes: the nature of consciousness, the bearer and location of psychological attributes, the intelligibility of so-called brain maps and representations, the notion of qualia, the coherence of the notion of an intentional stance, and the relationships between mind, brain, and body. Clearly argued and thoroughly engaging, the authors present fundamentally different conceptions of philosophical method, cognitive-neuroscientific explanation, and human nature, and their exchange will appeal to anyone interested in the relation of mind to brain, of psychology to neuroscience, of causal to rational explanation, and of consciousness to self-consciousness.In his conclusion Daniel Robinson (member of the philosophy faculty at Oxford University and ...